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BIFURCATED PROCEEDINGS IN ILLINOIS: SURVIVOR ACTIONS TO ARBITRATION BUT
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS TO LITIGATION
Joshua Bower*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 1 a special administrator of a former
nursing home resident’s estate asserted claims under the Nursing Home Care Act
(“NHCA”)2 and the Wrongful Death Act (“WDA”).3 The nursing home operator filed a
motion to compel arbitration that was denied by the trial court because of the agreement
lacked “mutuality of obligation” and the plaintiff was a nonsignatory to the arbitration
agreement in her personal capacity.4 Eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
general contract principles only require consideration for a valid arbitration agreement,
not “mutuality of obligation.”5 The Court also held that a wrongful-death claim was not
an “asset” of resident's estate that the resident could limit via an arbitration agreement,
but the special representative was bound to arbitrate survivor claims based on the
NHCA.6
II. BACKGROUND
In 2005 and 2006, Ms. Gott entered into two separate arbitration agreements with
a nursing home belonging to the defendant, SSC Odin Operation Company, LLC
(“Odin”).7 Her first residency was from May 20, 2005 until July 29, 2005.8 While being
admitted, the plaintiff Ms. Carter, acting as Gott’s legal representative, executed a written
“Health Care Arbitration Agreement” with Odin.9 The second residency occurred from
January 12, 2006 until Gott’s death on January 31, 2006.10 Six days after admission, Gott,
not Carter acting as a representative, signed the “Health Care Arbitration Agreement”
with Odin.11 Both agreements contained identical terms and conditions.12
The parties agreed to submit “all disputes . . . arising out of or in any way related
or connected to the Admission Agreement and all matters related thereto including
matters involving the Resident's stay and care provided at the Facility” where the amount
*

Joshua Bower is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2014 Juris
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 2012).
2
Nursing Home Care Act, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-101 (2013).
3
Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1 (2013).
4
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 348 (citing Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 885 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2008) rev'd, 927 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 2010).
5
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 351.
6
Id. at 360.
7
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. 2012).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 348 (citing Carter, 237 Ill. 2d 30 at 33, 927 N.E.2d at 1210 (2010)).
10
Carter, 976 N.E. at 348.
11
Id. (citing Carter, 927 N.E.2d at 1211).
12
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. 2012).
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in controversy is at least $200,000, to “binding arbitration.”13 The agreements bound
“each other and their representatives, affiliates, governing bodies, agents and
employees.”14 The arbitration sought to cover any dispute whether the cause of action
was based on contract, tort, or state or federal statutory rights.15 Odin also agreed to pay
the arbitrator fees, up to $5,000 of attorney’s fees, and gave the resident “the right to
choose the location of the arbitration.”16
After Gott’s death, Carter, acting as the special administrator of Gott’s estate,
brought two counts against Odin.17 The first count alleged that Odin violated the NHCA
when Gott sustained gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, and respiratory failure during her
second residency.18 Under the NHCA, this count was considered a survival action under
Illinois law.19 The second count sought recovery under the WDA for Gott’s heirs.20
Odin filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied after a
briefing without conducting an evidentiary hearing.21 The trial court found that the
arbitration agreements violated state public policy, lacked mutuality of obligation,
involved intrastate commerce, and were not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”).22 The appellate court affirmed the decision, reasoning that the antiwaiver
provisions in the NHCA presented a valid state law contract defense.23 The Illinois
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, reasoning that the anti-waiver provisions
were the “functional equivalent” of anti-arbitration legislation, which is “preempted by
the FAA and Supreme Court precedent.”24
The appellate court, on remand, once again affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
motion to compel arbitration, holding the agreements unenforceable due to a lack of
mutuality of obligation and that the plaintiff could not be compelled to arbitrate since she
did not sign in her individual capacity.25 The Illinois Supreme Court then granted the
defendant’s petition for leave to appeal to consider (1) the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement and (2) the arbitrability of the wrongful-death claim.26 The standard of review
would be de novo since the issues consider “statutory construction.”27

13

Id.
Id. at 348.
15
Id. at 349.
16
Id.
17
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. 2012).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 348.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 349.
22
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 885
N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)).
23
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 349 (Ill. 2012) (citing Carter, 885 N.E.2d
at 1204).
24
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding state
courts have no basis other than standard defenses to contract validity to challenge arbitration provisions)).
25
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 955 N.E.2d 1233, reh'g
denied (Sept. 16, 2011), appeal allowed, 963 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. 2012) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 976
N.E.2d 344)).
26
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349.
27
Id. (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. Chicago Hosp. Risk Pooling Program, 865 N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007).
14
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III. COURT’S ANALYSIS
A. Mutuality of Obligation
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that Section 2 of the FAA allows
state law contract defenses to invalidate an arbitration agreement only when the defenses
are generally applicable to all contracts.28 An arbitration agreement cannot be invalidated
by a state statute that only targets arbitration agreements.29 Since Illinois state law only
requires consideration for a contract to be valid, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
require mutuality of obligation for arbitration agreements.30 The Court defined
consideration as “[a]ny act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to
the other is a sufficient consideration to support a contract.”31 Courts cannot inquire into
the “adequacy”32 of the consideration nor require that the “values . . . exchanged be
equivalent.”33
The Court found that the “defendant's promise to pay the arbitrators' fees;
defendant's promise to pay $5,000 of Gott's attorney fees and costs in any action against
defendant; and Gott's right to choose the location of the arbitration” each constituted
sufficient consideration.34 The Court was not persuaded by Carter’s argument that the
promise to pay attorney’s fees was insufficient consideration since Odin was already
required to pay these fees under the NHCA.35 The Court pointed out that Carter could
only recover attorney’s fees under the NHCA if she prevailed, while the arbitral
agreement guaranteed $5,000 toward her attorney fees despite the outcome.36
B. Wrongful Death Action Not an Asset of Estate that Can Be Limited by
Decedent
The Court then addressed whether Carter could be compelled to arbitrate the
wrongful-death claim as a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreements.37 Odin argued that
a wrongful-death action is an asset of the decedent’s estate that can be limited by the
decedent during her lifetime.38 Since the decedent agreed to have “any and all disputes”
28

Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 350 (Ill. 2012) (quoting Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (“[g]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements”)).
29
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 350 (citing Doctor's Associates, Inc., 517 U.S. at 687).
30
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353.
31
Id. at 351 (quoting Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ill. 1977)).
32
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 351 (quoting Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 64 (Ill. 2007)).
33
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 351 (Ill. 2012) (citing Keefe v. Allied
Home Mortg. Corp., 912 N.E.2d 310, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,
183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir.1999) (observing that “state courts have concluded that an arbitration clause
need not be supported by equivalent obligations”)).
34
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353 (emphasis added).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. (nonsignatory in her personal capacity); see generally E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 294 (2002) (“It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty”).
38
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 2012) .
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settled by arbitration, her beneficiaries are bound by that agreement. 39 In essence, Odin
argued that a wrongful-death action is derivative of the decedent’s cause of action had
she lived.40 The Court was not persuaded by this argument and held that a wrongful-death
action is not derivative of the decedent’s estate.41
The Court acknowledged that a wrongful-death cause of action arises from the
Illinois WDA.42 Section 2 requires that a wrongful-death suit to be filed for “the
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person.”43 The
Court contrasted a wrongful-death action to a survival action, which belongs to the
decedent’s estate.44 The difference being that “[a] survival action allows for recovery of
damages for injury sustained by the deceased up to the time of death,” while a wrongfuldeath action “covers the time after death and addresses the injury suffered by the next of
kin due to the loss of the deceased rather than the injuries personally suffered by the
deceased prior to death.”45
Odin specifically cited WDA Section 2.1, which states “[i]n the event that the
only asset of the deceased estate is a cause of action arising under this Act . . .,”46 to
argue that the wrongful-death claim is an “asset” of the decedent’s estate that can be
limited by the decedent during her lifetime.47 After evaluating the legislative intent and
history behind the “estate” language, the Court rejected this argument.48
The Court examined how the legislature refused to treat a wrongful-death claim
like other assets under the Probate Act.49 Unlike other assets under the Probate Act, a
wrongful-death claim cannot be subject to the creditor’s claims nor “chargeable with the
expenses of estate administration.”50 While other assets are distributable according to a
will or intestacy law, a wrongful-death claim is not subject to the Probate Act and is
distributed to “each surviving spouse and next of kin . . . in proportion, determined by the
court.”51 The Court also noted that the legislature has not amended the WDA to change
this distribution.52
The Court agreed with the reasoning found in In Re Estate of Savio;53 specifically
that, the purpose of the term “asset” is to “facilitate the filing and prosecution of a

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id. at 354.
42
Id.
43
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 354 (Ill. 2012) (quoting 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT.180/2 (2006)).
44
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 354 (quoting 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27–6 (2006)); see also Vincent v.
Alden–Park Strathmoor, Inc., 948 N.E.2d 610 (Ill. 2011).
45
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353 (quoting Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 568 (Ill.
1989)).
46
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.1 (2006) (emphasis added).
47
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353.
48
Id. at 353-54.
49
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 355 (Ill. 2012) (citing 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/18–14 (2006)).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 356.
53
In re Estate of Savio, 902 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
40
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wrongful-death claim,” but not to “allow the deceased to control the forum and manner in
which a wrongful-death claim . . . is determined.”54
The Court further supported its conclusion by analyzing the legislative history.55
The Court cited Representative Beatty to conclude that the legislature intended the term
“asset” to “‘make it more convenient’ to bring a wrongful-death action, and ‘cut the red
tape’ by permitting a court to appoint a special administrator who could prosecute the
action without opening an estate.”56
C.

Survivor Actions Go to Arbitration; Wrongful Death Claims to Court

Although a claim under the WDA is considered “derivative”57 because the
personal representative can only bring a claim if the decedent had a right of action at the
time of their death,58 the Illinois Supreme Court refused to let the action be limited by an
arbitration agreement.59
Generally, a beneficiary’s right to sue depends on what causes of action the
decedent had at the time of their death.60 Odin argued that “just as a decedent's settlement
of a personal injury action constitutes a complete bar to a wrongful-death action based on
the same occurrence . . . Gott's agreement to arbitrate . . . limits the wrongful-death action
in the same manner.”61 The Court was not persuaded by this argument and found that
“the derivative nature of a wrongful-death action does not mean that she is subject to any
and all contractual limitations—such as an agreement to arbitrate—that are applicable to
the decedent.”62 The Court concluded that the plaintiff was “a nonparty to the arbitration
agreements” and could not be made to arbitrate the wrongful death action.63
Generally, contract law only compels parties to arbitrate if they were signatories
to the arbitration agreement.64 Since the plaintiff only signed the first arbitration
agreement as Gott’s legal representative, she is only required to arbitrate claims where
54

Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 357 (Ill. 2012).
Id.
56
Id. (citing 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 3, 1977, at 142 (statement of Rep.
Beatty)).
57
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 357 (citing Varelis v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 657 N.E.2d 997 (Ill.
1995)).
58
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 357 (quoting Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 30 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ill. 1940) (“the
deceased had no right of action at the time of his or her death, then the deceased's personal representative
has no right of action under the Wrongful Death Act”)).
59
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 359 (Ill. 2012).
60
Id. (citing Mooney v. Chicago, 88 N.E. 194, 196 (Ill. 1909) (beneficiary could not file a wrongful
death claim since decedent released his employer from all liability after a settlement for his personal injury
action)).
61
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 358.
62
Id. at 359; see also Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 46 (Utah 2008) (although decedent is “master of
his own claim,” he does not have power to bind beneficiaries to arbitration).
63
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 359; see also Finney v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 193 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006) (holding that a wrongful-death action does not belong to the decedent or decedent’s estate and
thus beneficiary does not “stand in shoes of decedent”).
64
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 359 (Ill. 2012); see Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v.
Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir.1995); Vukusich v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 150 Ill.App.3d
634, 640 (1986)).
55
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she acts in Gott’s place.65 The Court concluded that the plaintiff must arbitrate the
survivor action filed under the NHCA since she is acting in decedent’s stead.66 However,
the wrongful-death cause of action belongs to the next of kin and not the decedent’s
estate, thus the plaintiff was not required to arbitrate that claim.67
The Court distinguished the present case from a recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Marmet Health Center, Inc. v. Brown.68 In Marmet, a family member of
the decedent signed an arbitration agreement and later brought suits for negligence. 69 The
West Virginia Supreme Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement due to the
public policy against pre-dispute personal injury or wrongful-death arbitration
agreements.70 The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the “FAA's text
includes no exception for personal injury or wrongful-death claims . . . and the
prohibition . . . is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim,
and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.”71 The Illinois Supreme
Court distinguished its holding from Marmet since its decision was not dependent on “a
categorical anti-arbitration rule,” but basic “common law principles governing all
contracts.”72
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
A. Mutuality of Obligation Not Required, Only Consideration Needed
The Illinois Supreme Court did not require mutuality of obligation for arbitration
agreements, only that each party gives the other proper consideration.73 It will not,
however, evaluate the adequacy of consideration.74 The Court defined consideration as
“any act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is a
sufficient consideration to support a contract.”75 The Court also concluded that
contractual promises to pay for the arbitrator’s fees, partial payment for attorney’s fees,
and the right to choose the location of arbitration were each individually sufficient
65

Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 360.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. (citing Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012)).
69
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 360 (Ill. 2012) (citing Marmet Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S.Ct. at 1204).
70
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011) cert. granted, judgment vacated
sub nom., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
71
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 360 (citing Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204).
72
Id. (citing Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204).
73
Id. (citing Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Cont’l Can Co., 133 N.E. 711, 714 (Ill. 1921) (“any
other consideration for the contract mutuality of obligation is not essential”)).
74
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 2012); see also Gallagher v.
Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 64 (Ill. 2007); Ryan v. Hamilton, 68 N.E. 781, 782 (Ill. 1903) (“adequacy of the
consideration is within the exclusive dominion of the parties where they contract freely and without
fraud”).
75
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353; see also Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ill. 1977)
([a]ny act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is a sufficient
consideration to support a contract”).
66
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consideration.76 The court implied that the right to choose location alone would be
sufficient consideration for the weaker party’s agreement to arbitrate.77
By only requiring consideration by both parties as opposed to mutuality of
obligation, the Illinois Supreme Court increased the likelihood that arbitration provisions
would be enforced by courts. This ruling also continues the trend of enforcing adhesive
arbitration agreements.78 Consideration sets a lower bar that is more easily met than
mutuality of obligation. Courts, being quite familiar with general principles of contract
law, will quickly and proficiently be able to apply those standards to arbitration
provisions.
When drafting arbitration agreements, practitioners should include provisions that
clearly benefit the other party to their own detriment. Case law indicates that courts seem
to favor agreements wherein the stronger party agrees to bear the cost of arbitration,
especially where the weaker party enters the agreement under adhesive circumstances.79
Although the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the right to choose the arbitration
location alone was sufficient consideration, practitioners should be aware that some
courts would likely rule such provisions unconscionable.80
B. Third-Party Beneficiaries Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Wrongful Death
Claims Since Claims are Not Derivative of Estate
In Illinois, healthcare facilities are unable to compel third-party beneficiaries to
arbitrate wrongful-death claims even if the decedent agreed to bind their
“representatives.”81 The Illinois Supreme Court’s holding makes it much more difficult
for healthcare facilities to arbitrate wrongful-death claims. To ensure arbitrability, a
healthcare provider would need to seek out the signature of the future personal
representative of the decedent or the decedent’s potential heirs. As one court points out,
this requirement is unrealistic and impractical since potential heirs “are not even
identified until the time of death,” may not “be available at time required,” or “refuse to

76

Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353.
Id. (defendant's promise to pay the arbitrators' fees, attorney’s fees, and Gott's right to choose the
location of the arbitration, each constitute a benefit to Gott and a detriment to defendant).
78
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011) (striking down California
judicial precedent, permits adhesive arbitration agreements featuring class action waivers in consumer
settings).
79
See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (holding that the party
seeking invalidation of an arbitration agreement because it would be “prohibitively expensive . . . bears the
burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs” has caused variety of responses among lower
courts); see also Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, 425 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2005) (refused to enforce the “loser pays”
cost-shifting provision); but see Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2004) (a
provision that allowed employer to be reimbursed for arbitrator’s fees and expenses by employee not
deemed unconscionable).
80
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 2012).
81
Id.
77
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sign.”82 Furthermore, state and federal patient privacy statutes prevent health facilities
from requiring the disclosure of sensitive medical information.83
Whether a third-party beneficiary can be compelled to arbitrate is highly
dependent on whether that particular state classifies a wrongful-death action as a
derivative right or an independent third-party right. The majority of states have ruled that
third-party beneficiaries can be compelled to arbitrate. These states include: Alabama,84
California,85 Indiana,86 Mississippi,87 and Texas.88 A minority of states including
Kentucky,89 Missouri,90 Ohio,91 and Washington92 refuse to compel arbitration for nonsignatory beneficiaries. A handful of states refused to compel arbitration on the basis of
agency law.93 The Florida Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Laizure v. Avante
at Leesburg, Inc. to decide this issue.94

82

Herbert v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 3d 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
See generally Health Ins. Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 29 (2006)); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 (West 2012)
(parental consent not required for minors seeking specific medical treatment).
84
See Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 665 (Ala. 2004) (executor and
administratrix of estates of nursing home residents bound by arbitration provisions since they “stand in the
shoes of the decedent,” therefore have the same powers and restrictions as decedent); see also Entrekin v.
Internal Med. Assocs. of Dothan, P.A., 689 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Under Alabama law,
executor . . . required to arbitrate her wrongful death claim . . . even though executor did not personally
sign agreement since resident was bound by agreement during her life”).
85
See Ruiz v. Podolsky, 237 P.3d 584, 594-95 (Cal. 2010) (compelled arbitration for all wrongful
death claimants since broad arbitration agreement included “any spouses or heirs . . . and any children” and
health care facilities’ “reasonable contractual expectations” would be defeated otherwise).
86
See Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (thirdparty beneficiaries compelled to arbitrate because state statute “only allows a personal representative to
maintain a cause of action ‘if the decedent, if alive, might have maintained’”).
87
See Trinity Mission Health & Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Scott, 19 So. 3d 735, 740 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008) (compelled arbitration, finding that wrongful-death action is derivative, thus beneficiary must
stand in the position of decedent. Since decedent’s claims “would have been subject to arbitration,” so must
beneficiaries’).
88
See In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2009) (compelled arbitration since
under state statute, “wrongful death beneficiaries may pursue a cause of action…only if the individual
injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if the individual had lived”).
89
See Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 599 (Ky. 2012) (refused to compel arbitration
because beneficiaries’ claim is not “derived through or on behalf of the Resident”).
90
See Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Mo. 2009) (refused to compel arbitration
because “[w]rongful death statute creates a new cause of action . . . does not revive a cause of action
belonging to the deceased; the right of action thus created is neither a transmitted right nor a survival
right”).
91
See Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 2006-Ohio-382 aff'd, 2007-Ohio-4787, 115 Ohio St. 3d
134, 138, 873 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (refused to compel arbitration since “survival claims and wrongful-death
claims are distinct claims that belong to separate individuals”).
92
See Woodall v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Fed. Way, LLC, 231 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010)
(refused to compel arbitration since wrongful death statutes “create new causes of action for the benefit of
specific surviving relatives,” thus not derivative).
93
See Munn v. Haymount Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc., 704 S.E.2d 290, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)
(refused to compel arbitration on grounds that beneficiary lacked agency to enter the decedent into
arbitration agreement).
94
See Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 51 So. 3d 465 (Fla. 2010) ; see also Laizure v. Avante at
Leesburg, Inc., 44 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that wrongful death claim was arbitrable
83
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V. CRITIQUE
A. Bifurcation of Claims Creates an Ineffective Procedure Causing Higher
Costs and Disparate Outcomes
This ruling places a heavy burden on the court system and on the parties involved
by requiring two separate adjudicative proceedings based on practically identical facts. In
Illinois, survival claims, such as claims under the NHCA, are subject to arbitration.
Wrongful-death claims, however, are not. With this separation, the Illinois Supreme
Court invites disparate outcomes, multiple “bites at the same apple,” and raises costs for
all parties involved. This undermines the efficacy of arbitration.
Both the survival claim and the wrongful-death claim concern the same tortious
events. In spite of this reality, the Carter decision forces healthcare facilities and
beneficiaries into two separate proceedings95 based on similar, if not identical, facts with
the possibility of drastically different outcomes. This outcome is despised by the legal
system and should be avoided.96 This bifurcated procedure is quite costly, with the
healthcare provider bearing the brunt of the costs. Using the instant case as a model, if
Carter sought recovery for both claims, Odin would be responsible for any arbitration
fees, up to $5,000 in attorney’s fees for Carter related to the arbitration, their own
attorney fees for arbitration, and their own attorney fees and court costs for litigation.
Furthermore, if Carter prevails in litigation, Odin would also be responsible for Carter’s
attorney fees under the NHCA.97 This assessment does not include the cost of expert
witnesses or economic waste of witnesses wasting valuable time and money testifying on
the same essential facts in two different proceedings. It is clear that the beneficiaries now
have considerable bargaining power with the threat of costly court proceedings to force
healthcare facilities into settlements.
Even with the split proceeding option, beneficiaries may agree to post-dispute
arbitration since the healthcare facilities usually agree to bear the cost of arbitration.
Healthcare facilities should offer incentives to persuade the beneficiary to agree to postdispute arbitration such as paying the arbitration fees or covering some attorney costs.98
This will cause the arbitration proceeding to be more costly for the healthcare facilities
than if all disputes went to arbitration due to a pre-dispute agreement.

because within scope of arbitration provision and “replaced the personal injury claim” that patient could of
brought).
95
Unless both parties agree to a post-dispute arbitration agreement, which is a rarity. See generally
David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix
the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 1, 7 (2003) (Employment law context: post-dispute voluntary arbitration is . . . according to the evidence
carefully examined herein . . . extremely rare).
96
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (which allows for class action certification to avoid inconsistent or varying
adjudications).
97
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 2012) (citing 210 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/3-602 (2013) (licensee shall pay the actual damages and costs and attorney's fees to a facility
resident whose rights, as specified in Part 1 of Article II of this Act, are violated)).
98
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349 (enticed beneficiary to arbitrate by offering to pay arbitrator’s fees, cover
partial attorney costs, and allow beneficiary the right to choose arbitration location).
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Since reviewing courts must be highly deferential toward arbitral awards,99
bifurcated proceedings create a very real possibility of a court speaking out of both sides
of its mouth. Suppose the court denies recovery for the wrongful-death claim yet the
arbitrator finds for the beneficiary in the survivor claim. The court will likely have to
affirm the arbitral award, even though it stands in direct opposition to its own finding.
This ruling also undermines the express intent of the parties involved and the
“bargained-for” exchange. The arbitration agreement expressly sought to bind the patient
and her “successors, assigns, agents, attorneys, insurers, heirs, trustees, and
representatives, including the personal representative or executor of her estate.”100 By
ignoring the express intent of the parties, the Court undermines one of the core tenants of
arbitration, that it is a voluntarily agreement entered into by both parties seeking an
efficient adjudication of their dispute.101
The most efficient and economical procedure would have required both the
wrongful-death and survivor claims to be decided by one adjudicator, the arbitrator. Yet
the Illinois Supreme Court has chosen bifurcated proceedings for tortious claims resting
on essentially the same facts. While expanding the policy favoring arbitration by only
requiring consideration for contract validity, the Court simultaneously narrowed the
scope of arbitration by bifurcating wrongful-death claims from arbitration.

99

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011).
Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353.
101
Id.
100
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